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"A jury consists of twelve persons chosen to decide who has the better
lawyer."
- Robert Frost

I.

THE NUMBERS

As observed by Judge Young,l the number of federal civil jury trials 2
showed a remarkable decline of more than one-fourth in the decade

* FREDERICK N. SMALLKIN: Johns Hopkins University, B.A.; University of Maryland
School of Law, J.D.; Senior United States District Judge, D. Md.; Senior Judicial Fellow in
Residence and Lecturer, University of Maryland School of Law; Adjunct Professor, University of Baltimore Law School; Practitioner Faculty, Johns Hopkins University Schools of
Business and Medicine. This author is grateful to his University of Maryland colleagues
William Reynolds and Oscar Gray and his Johns Hopkins University colleagues Douglas E.
Hough and Erik Gordon for their helpful suggestions. FREDERICK N.C. SMALKIN: University of Virginia, B.A. in Economics; University of Maryland School of Law (J.D. Candidate).
This author is grateful to his father and co-author, and to his professors at Mr. Jefferson's
University, Drs. Paul Halliday, Massimo Guidolin and Albert Choi. This article was published electronically in August 2005.
1.
William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, FED. LAW., July 2003, at
30.
2.
As reported on a fiscal-year basis by the ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, Statistics,
Fiscal years 1997-2002, tbls.C-4, C-4a, & C-7, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususd
judbus.html.
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1989-99. 3 The authors have brought the numbers up to date, through
fiscal year 2002. The decline has continued, as Table I below clearly
demonstrates:
TABLE
TRIALS

FY 1997-2002:

I:

JURY AND NONJURY

FIll:. I '\11 I f

It is interesting to note from Table I that the decline in completed

trials is not confined to jury trials, but extends to completed trials, both
jury and nonjury, which correlate with an r2 of 0.99. 4 This decline in
total trials of both sorts is addressed neither by Young nor by much
recent literature disparaging what is seen as judicial aversion to the
jury; this is omitted for an important reason, explained below.
3. The number of civil filings, in contrast, showed remarkably little fluctuation from
1993 through 2002. The figures are: 1993-229,850; 1994-236,391; 1995-248,335;
1996-269,132; 1997-272,027; 1998-256,787; 1999-260,271; 2000-259,517; 2001-250,907;
2002-274,841. See id. at tbl.C. These figures readily lend themselves to a conclusion that
many cases are simply not filed in the Article III forum in the first place, because, given a
growing population (both in the general population and in the ranks of lawyers) and significant yearly increases in statutory civil remedies from new legislation without offsetting repeal of older remedies, one would expect a substantial increase in the number of filings over
the years rather than a plateau.
4.
The Administrative Office reports from which Table I is compiled do not separately
report trials conducted by Magistrate Judges. Interestingly, the numbers of jury and nonjury trials conducted by Magistrate Judges, with consent of the litigants, see 28 U.S.c.
§ 636(c), show a decline from highs of 892 and 656, respectively, in 1998 to 472 and 487,
respectively, in 2002, as reported in JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 2, at tbI.S-17.

2006]

A Closer Look at Vanishing Trials

419

It is illuminating to look to at least one major alternative to the
federal trial-jury or nonjury-and that is the number of arbitrations
instituted with the American Arbitration Association, set forth below
in Table II:
TABLE

II:

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION

1992-2002

TOTAL CASES FILED
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A simple comparison shows that while the number of federal trials
has been decreasing markedly, the number of arbitrations has been increasing markedly. Unfortunately, the limited nature of the data precludes a more statistically robust analysis of the correlation between
jury trials and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Nevertheless,
these obvious trends beget the questions: Where has the litigation gone,
and is there good reason to suspect migration out of the judicial forum
in favor of others, like arbitration, rather than simply natural growth in
the number of arbitrations?
Four possible answers suggest themselves, but can be dispatched
without lengthy discussion. The first is that people are becoming generally less litigious. However, the number of federal civil filings has seen
no significant decline over the relevant time period. One might next
assume that the number of trials completed has declined simply because federal civil trials are getting postponed more often than in the
past and untried civil cases are simply accumulating, while judges do
other things, like deal with a burgeoning criminal caseload. This was
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also investigated by the authors, but was found not to be the case, as
the reported statistics show only a 2.8% increase in median time from
filing to trial in civil cases between 1997 and 2002. A third possible
answer is that cases filed recently are somehow systematically less "deserving" of trial, in some objective sense. However, there is little reason
to believe that this is the case, even if such an assessment of relative
merit could be made. Lastly, one might assume that these cases are
being litigated in other judicial fora, but there is mounting evidence
that jury trials in state court are systematically decreasing as well.
Some would argue that a shift to arbitration is primarily or entirely
the product of increased disparate bargaining power at the forum
choice point, which is often at the time of contracting. But a few observations contraindicate unilateral imposition as the most likely explanation of these trends. First, arbitration clauses are not universal enough
to have the kind of impact seen in these figures. Second, while there
has been much argument in favor of enforcing such forum choice
clauses, they are still subject to nullification as contracts of adhesion
and may be defeated under the minimum contacts test, placing their
efficacy in doubt. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile this hypothesis
with the fact that federal civil filings have not been decreasing overall.
This combination indicates that whatever primarily lies behind the decline in trials is a result of choices made after the events giving rise to a
claim.
An explanation that appears to some to be intuitive is that judges
are to blame. Some would argue that judges are intentionally discriminating against juries. In that case, we should expect to see a more distinct decline in jury trials, as compared to bench trials. Yet, as noted
above, the decline in both jury and non-jury trials correlates almost
perfectly. Alternatively, the decline has been attributed to a crushing
federal workload, mainly due to increased criminal prosecutions. However, new judgeships are added each year to keep up with the volume
of cases (fifteen in 2003), and in any event, this explanation does not
address the surge in AD R seen in the last few years.
A reliable indicator of trends affecting litigation is the proverbial
man on the street, or, in our case, the lawyer at the water-cooler. Anyone who spends more than a few minutes standing by a law firm watercooler will conclude, based on litigators' focus on "the twin v's" venue
and venire, that a major strategic concern is the composition of the
jury. Pretrial rulings on these issues will have an overriding impact on
parties' willingness to settle, rather than proceed to trial.
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Even if limitations imposed by the nature of the reported data preclude demonstrating, with robust statistical significance, a direct causal
relationship between declining federal trials and increasing arbitrations,
arbitration is, at the very least, perceived as an attractive alternative
forum by both those with disputes, who increasingly seek it, and at least
one respected and experienced member of the federal judiciary, viz,
Chief Judge Young.
It just may be that judges are guilty of professional narrow-mindedness, but not the kind envisioned by Professor Miller and others. In
other words, they are not shirking their responsibilities by denying parties their day in court, but are failing to recognize the attractiveness of
alternative fora and the implications this has for the judiciary.
These observations lead us to suggest that fora can and do compete in the market for litigation, and that litigation will tend to move, in
obedience to ordinary market forces, to the least-cost forum, irrespective of party advantage. This paper attempts to describe the mechanism through which juries systematically increase uncertainty and
thereby impose costs on both sides, driving litigation not just away from
the courts by settlements, but to alternative fora that are increasingly
attractive to both plaintiffs and defendants.
These trends are only keenly seen over time; trials declined for
years before people started widespread discussion of the phenomenon.
Phenomena that occur over time constitute a story. We therefore begin
as any good story should-long, long ago.

II.

A

LESSON FROM LEGAL HISTORY

To a large extent, the history of the development of the legal system of England from the time of the Norman Conquest through the
end of the eighteenth century is the story of evolving notions of jurisdiction (in the sense of a forum's willingness to entertain a case, assuming it has the power to do so). This evolution was powered by the
interacting self-interests of fora and litigants.
By the fifteenth century, the jurisdictions of the two superior national courts of England, within bounds set by Magna Carta, had become fairly well settled by tradition and usage: King's Bench had
jurisdiction over matters in which the Crown had an interest, while
Common Pleas handled private disputes. Until the Crown fell into the
hands of the Tudors at the end of the War of the Roses, the King's
Bench was not a busy court, as compared to Common Pleas: "Its
records filled only a few hundred skins of parchment a year, whereas
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those of Common Pleas filled a thousand or two." During the fifteenth
century, both of the superior courts experienced a migration of litigation to alternative fora, i.e., the King's Council and Chancery, where
business was taken by "common lawyers, who resorted to them because
of the attraction of their relative informality, the ease with which defendants could be arrested, and the inquisitorial method of investigation which by-passed the sheriff and the jury."
"[T]heir initial success was perceived as a threat to the business of
the common-law courts." This loss of judicial business principally impacted the King's Bench, which reacted by developing "swift process
and procedure to vie with that of the Chancery, and acquired a jurisdiction over most common pleas by a combination of procedural devices."
This did not sit well with Common Pleas, resulting in the "legal disputes
of the later sixteenth century [which] took on the appearance of an
internecine struggle for business between the common-law courts
themselves .... " Although the personnel of King's Bench had a personal stake "in furthering this amplification of their jurisdiction, they
were at the same time meeting strong popular demands." The key
point for the present analysis is that "popular demand" was Adam
Smith's invisible hand, quietly guiding disputes into the forum where
they could be resolved at least cost (risk being a form of cost): "The
principal competitors were not the judges or officers [of the courts]
themselves but the litigants and their lawyers, shopping for the most
advantageous forum."
King's Bench, in particular, went to lengths in order to attract
more business. In the sixteenth century, "King's Bench wooed litigants
with competitive costs, and sometimes even lowered its fees in order to
increase the overall takings," a universal practice of the volume seller.
Jurisdictional expansion was accomplished by a device labeled the "bill
of Middlesex," which got around cumbersome, older mechanisms for
acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant's person by alleging a fictional
trespass occurring in the County of Middlesex, where King's Bench sat.
There would be an allegation that the defendant had trespassed against
the plaintiff in Hendon, and "[i]t mattered not whether the plaintiff or
defendant had ever set foot in Hendon, or even Middlesex." The fictional trespass would simply be disregarded, while the dispute proceeded to be resolved on its merits according to the common law,
whether in trespass or in debt or detinue. The net effect of all this was
to increase the business of the King's Bench by a factor of ten between
1560 and 1640. This increase was clearly the result of competitive be-

2006]

A Closer Look at Vanishing Trials

423

havior on the part of King's Bench, which "had no monopoly, and ...
thrived only by satisfying litigants and the profession at large."
Although Common Pleas attempted to meet the competition, it
was bound to the ancient, cumbersome writ procedure for acquiring
jurisdiction, and it could not resort to any fiction as convenient as the
Bill of Middlesex. Furthermore, it was not economically competitive,
as "it failed to make substantial reductions in its own scale of costs,
allegedly because the three prothonotaries could never reach agreement on any specific proposal for cuts." The Common Pleas did not
see an overall diminution in its caseload, as there was an overall increase in litigation during this period. Common Pleas' bar was ten
times larger than that of King's Bench, and it included a substantial
number of attorneys who practiced throughout the country, rather than
simply at Westminster. Thus, "the business of the Common Pleas increased considerably during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, albeit at a slower rate than that of the King's Bench."
Interestingly, the end of the King's Bench-Common Pleas competition was accomplished both by legislation in 1661 designed to cut back
on King's Bench's jurisdictional fictions and by Common Pleas' own
adoption of a jurisdiction-enhancing fiction in 1675.
Why did these courts compete with each other for business in the
first place throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? Other
than professional pride and prejudice, the most compelling motivation
was the compensation of judges and other court officers. It was not
until much later that the concept of English judicial and quasi-judicial
office as a property right to be held in freehold, capable of being
bought and sold, died out; remuneration of the judge in the form of fees
was not replaced by a stated annual salary until 1826. In the period of
intense jurisdictional competition discussed above, put simply, more litigation meant more money lining the judicial robe. The courts were
acting, in large part, out of selfish economic considerations when establishing their jurisdictions and setting their procedures.
Interestingly, friction between the arbitral forum itself and the
common law courts from economic competition can be traced back to
the same period of inter-judicial competition addressed above. The
great legal historian and Chancellor Lord Campbell observed:
There was no disguising the fact that, as formerly, the emoluments of the
Judges depended mainly, or almost entirely, upon fees, and as they had no
fixed salaries, there was great competition to get as much as possible of
litigation into Westminster Hall, ... for the division of the spoil ... And
they had great jealousy of arbitrations whereby Westminster Hall was
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robbed of those cases which came not into Kings Bench, nor the Common
Pleas, nor the Exchequer. Therefore they said that the courts ought not to
be ousted of their jurisdiction, and that it was contrary to the policy of the
law to do so. That really grew up only subsequently to the time of Lord
Coke, and a saying of his was the foundation of the doctrine. 5

III.

THE JURY'S

IN

The archetypal Anglo-American dispute resolution mechanism is,
of course, the trial of issues of fact before the jury. Juries in English
law predate the Norman Conquest. Over many centuries, and for a
number of reasons, the jury's character underwent a remarkable
change. With small license, the modern jury can conveniently be
thought of as having evolved markedly from its ancestor, a group of
locals essentially called as witnesses and sworn to speak the true facts
as they knew them to the King's justices, as those justices came to the
shires from the seat of government to extend the King's writ and to
exercise his judicial power. During the fourteenth century, the jury
gradually was transformed into a more neutral body of fact-finders,
who were not expected to have first-hand knowledge of the disputants
or their dispute. Judges exercised tremendous control over juries, and
could even attaint them for a false verdict. Except for this element of
judicial control, the modern American jury has not changed much in its
basic role in the legal process from its Tudor ancestor to the present,
though, as will be shown, it has changed markedly in its composition
and-at least in England-its utilization.
The English civil jury, ancestor of America's, has fallen into almost
complete desuetude, with what, in historical perspective, has been remarkable swiftness. It started with the enactment of the Common Law
Procedure Act of 1854, enabling the parties to consent to fact-finding
by the judge, as "[a]ll the experience suggested that judges were more
likely to understand the factual issues them laymen, and were as competent to assess evidence." The decline was not only swift, it was broad:
In the course of the twentieth century, however, the alternative of jury
trial more or less disappeared. The very existence of an option made the
decision to ask for a jury suspicious: it suggested the hope of confusion in
a weak case, or the expectation of exorbitant damages in cases involving
distressing details or high feelings .... Since 1933 parties have been allowed juries only with leave of the court, except in cases of libel and a few
5.
[d. at 983-84 n.14 (punctuation in original) (quoting Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J.Ex. 308,
313 (1856». In Kulukundis, Judge Frank, writing for the court, famously quipped about the
doctrine under discussion: "Give a bad dogma a good name and its bite may become as bad
as its bark." !d. at 984.
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other matters; and the courts have indicated their unwillingness to give
such leave. 6

These developments are all the more remarkable because they
took place without legislation, by the common consent of the participants in the English public adjudication market, primarily English lawyers (who have been historically precluded from taking cases on a
contingent fee basis). In short, the market for civil jury trials in England simply dried up.
American federal courts, of course, do not enjoy the ability of their
English cousins simply to dispense with the civil jury as unreliable or
outmoded. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution guarantees
most federal civil litigants a jury trial when the enormous sum of twenty
dollars is in controversy, and many state constitutions provide similar
guarantees.
The jury of the Seventh Amendment's Age of Enlightenment and
the modern civil trial jury are, however, two very different institutions.
Again, history is instructive.
Alexis de Tocqueville praised the common law jury of his age, calling it "as direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the
people as universal suffrage." Of course, it is well known that suffrage
in America at the time of de Tocqueville was far from universal; indeed,
it was not until much later that traditionally excluded groups (women
of all races and African-Americans) gained the right to vote. And what
of juries? Were they, in de Tocqueville's day, as far from representative
of the general population as was the electorate? Surprisingly, at least in
the federal courts, they were; and, more surprisingly, they remained so
until well into the latter half of the twentieth century. Indeed, it has
been said that "Eighteenth-century juries were, ... 'the Rotarians of
their day.'"
The procedure for assembling a jury venire in the federal district
courts was not made uniform throughout the country until enactment
of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968. Before that Act, most
6.
[d. Although juries are still used in serious criminal cases in England, the Blair
Government tried as recently as July 2003, to do away with them in a range of complex and
difficult cases. The Government's proposal was effectively defeated in the House of Lords.
Press Release, Associated Press, House of Lords Overturns Government Plan to End Trial By
Jury for Complex Fraud Cases (July 15, 2003), available at www.westlaw.com (AP Worldstar
Directory). This led to one of the more interesting legal observations of all time. The Home
Office Minister, Baroness Scotland, QC, was quoted as having told lTV News, in reaction to
the Lords' decision, that the abolition of jury trials as sought by the Government was a "real
reform. We're allowing the guilty really to have an opportunity to be found guilty." Andrew
Pierce, The Lords, TIMES (London), July 17,2003, at 6.
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federal juries were selected by the "key man" system. The chief judge
of the district selected a "key man" who would assemble a venire for a
term of court, calling upon individuals personally known or recommended to him who would make "good" jurors, in his estimation.
From this venire, the petit juries were empanelled at trial, after voir
dire conducted by the trial judge. As the legislative history of the 1968
Act so eloquently understated it, "[o]ften the [key man] system results
in under-representation of craftsmen, service workers, and laborers as
compared with the professional and managerial classes." In fact, the
federal trial jury known to the previous generation of lawyers was a
select jury.
Surprisingly little is said in general English legal history texts about
the method of jury selection at common law. We do know, however,
that sheriffs of the counties played the key role in jury selection. For
example, in the course of discussing the general state of political and
legal corruption in the fifteenth century, one distinguished scholar
noted, "[t]he sheriffs were the tools of greater men, and, through their
power over juries, the law of the country was at their mercy." The socalled gentleman jury, impaneled by the sheriff for important cases, was
limited by law to gentlemen of what for the time was substantial wealth
("men of quality"); and, in some cases, required a venire to be assembled from those "legally entitled to be called esquire, or a person of
high decree [sic], such as a banker, a merchant, or the head of a dwelling rated at not less than one-hundred pounds in a town of 20,000 or
fifty pounds elsewhere."
The "gentleman jury," moreover, was only one type of jury, and
none of the others was very different in terms of its lack of
inclusiveness:
Four types of special juries existed in common law England. The first
type, the gentleman jury, consisted of men of high social or economic status. The second type, the struck jury, was selected upon the demand of
either party and consisted of principal landowners selected from a list of
forty-eight names. The third type, the professional jury, had members
who possessed special knowledge or expertise. The fourth and most
unique type, the party jury, attempted to ensure a foreign defendant of
fairness by encompassing only individuals who were the same race, sex, or
origin as the defendant.?

Of course, the "key man" system utilized in federal practice until
the late 1960s did not differ much in terms of its product from the subjective selection processes noted above and no doubt familiar to those
7.

Jd. at 8-9.
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who drafted the Seventh Amendment. And the practice was not much
different in most state courts, select juries yielding only over time to
those chosen, as today, from the populace at large (or some segment
thereof, such as registered voters), more or less at random. The present, randomly selected and minimally qualified (i.e., meeting only criteria such as having a driver's license or being registered to vote) jury
may be labeled the "modern" jury.
IV.

JUDICIAL ECONOMICS

Of course, judges are no longer remunerated by fees (or, one
hopes, in bribes), but are paid a stated salary, no matter how much or
how little judicial business comes before them. Thus, they no longer
have any financial motive to increase the judicial business of the courts
on which they serve; rather, if there is too much judicial business, there
may be an incentive to decrease it. As discussed above, it has been
suggested that judges are selfishly abandoning their duties, for example,
by unjustifiably granting defendants' motions for summary judgment.
But an examination of their actions alone is misdirected, though understandable. It is quite natural to conclude that judges will do what they
can to avoid the hard work of conducting trials, but it is not a lack of
judges' services (supply) that is shifting the market to ADR. In fact,
the shortfall is in demand for the ultimate exercise of judicial authority-the trial-which can spring only from the popUlation of litigants.
Much has been written addressing the rising costs of litigation,
most of which focuses on the cost and delay associated with a modern
jury trial of the facts. Time has always been equated with money, as the
old saying bears witness, and the delay and added work associated with
the jury trial burden both sides.
The burgeoning role of jury experts points us to the crux of the
topic at hand. Any lawyer has some conception of his ideal jury panel,
but jury consulting firms go far beyond the practitioner's common
sense and employ professional psychologists and sociologists. Why
would a litigant add so drastically to litigation costs, when already faced
with mounting expenditures? The answer lies in the existence and perception of risk in today's jury system.
As history demonstrates, there is a market in dispute resolution,
and there is no reason to think it behaves any differently from other
markets. In today's adjudication market, economists have identified as
a driving force the implicit cost of the jury-the risk that comes from
the jury's uncertainty of outcome. Modern market theory, well estab-
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lished and accepted in the field of economics, tells us that bearing risk
is work, just like any other, and is compensated as such. We assume
this has not been central to much previous legal analysis because the
relevant economic literature is fairly recent, and the factors involved
are not explicit costs in classic economic theory.
All legal professionals have been exposed to the concept of bearing risk as work, although they may not be aware of it. It is common
knowledge that plaintiffs' lawyers seek to maximize fees, taking advantage of the so-called "American rule" that tolerates contingency payments that are often quite large. Their size is justified (and accepted by
even those who stand in moral opposition to what they do) because
these lawyers are not guaranteed payment in every case. But that is
only half the story; the key here is that their higher fees are justified not
only with regard to individual cases, but over their entire careers because, aside from being lawyers, they are also in the business of being
small banks that finance litigation. They are entitled to a sort of interest payment that defense attorneys do not charge, because the latter do
not carry risk.
Once assessed, risk can be divided into two kinds, "systemic" and
"idiosyncratic." These categories of risk can be applied to the judicial
system if we consider the payoff from a case-whether it be an award
or the avoidance thereof-as a sort of legal "security."
The behavior of the securities market has been the subject of considerable study. In that market, idiosyncratic risk describes uncertainties associated with a particular security. In law, idiosyncratic risk
would be the unknowns of an individual case, such as a client's information not divulged to counselor uncertainty of outcome. (Indeed, a certain amount of risk is necessary to have a live case or controversy, the
risk being uncertainty about the applicable law or the facts.) In theory,
idiosyncratic risk can be minimized by diversification. For example, a
plaintiff's lawyer who takes, on a contingency basis, a large number of
cases might typically charge a smaller percentage than another plaintiff's lawyer who only pursues a small number of large cases. A useful
analogy would be to compare a bank with a large volume of small loans
to a venture capital firm that has a small number of very large loans.
In contrast, systemic risk applies to variables that affect multiple
securities and those securities' collective response. Having factored out
idiosyncratic risk, evaluating systemic risk allows careful investors to
choose precisely the amount of risk they wish to bear and, accordingly,
the compensation they wish to receive. Investing is again illustrative, as
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in the simple case of bonds versus stocks. An investor with a long-time
horizon would choose a diversified portfolio of stocks, which are far
riskier in the short-term but bring higher reward in the long-term.
Nearing retirement, the investor would move her money into bonds,
giving up remuneration, but lowering her risk. This phenomenon is reflected in the practice of law; it is generally true that those who practice
in the less predictable areas of the law (such as plaintiffs' tort work) ask
an accordingly higher compensation, usually in the form of a contingency fee that can run into the millions, as opposed to an hourly fee or
"value billing." But, salient legal risk depends not only on the merits or
circumstances of an individual case, or even its general type, but also on
the forum that entertains it. If we think of the courts as stocks, and
ADR as bonds, the modern jury brings systemic risk-especially from
high-end outlier verdicts-to the courts. Hence, the careful investor, in
our case the prudent lawyer, can maximize gains or minimize losses by
choosing one dispute resolution mechanism over the other.
As mentioned above, there is evidence that it was the self-interest
of litigants and their attorneys that dictated forum choice in the Tudor
through Stuart periods. Self-interest, as a basic motivator of human
behavior, of course, cannot be expected to have disappeared or diminished appreciably in the few hundred years since the jurisdictional wars
of the English courts came to an end. If a litigant has the power to
maneuver the resolution of a dispute into a forum perceived as more
advantageous to him-whether from the standpoint of exposure to unpredictable high outlier verdicts, speed and cost of adjudication, or
other factors-both common sense and microeconomic theory suggest
that he will do so, as, for example, by inserting a binding arbitration
clause or other sort of forum selection clause (e.g., home-state, federal
court only) in a contract. And, of course, those same fundamental
forces suggest that, if both sides perceive the advantage of one forum
over another, their behavior will demonstrate mutual accord, even if no
agreement on dispute resolution was reached in a particular case ex
ante.
Estimations of a forum's cost have various roots and take various
forms. There are some obvious factors that will influence litigants. For
example, defense lawyers quite naturally and correctly perceive that a
judge is less likely to award a huge amount of damages (especially for
non-economic injury or punitive damages) than a jury (yet, there are
data showing that plaintiffs have a higher mean success rate in a number of categories of cases, in terms of win/loss, not of damage award
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size, when a judge is the fact-finder). One should note, though, that
alternative dispute resolution does not always (or necessarily) benefit
the defendant alone. For example, the speed and low cost with which
arbitration can settle a dispute may work in favor of the plaintiff's attorney who handles a large volume of cases and/or is underwriting costs
for an impecunious clientele.
Although there are arguably many possible costs and benefits that
might steer either side towards a particular forum, economic analysis
demonstrates that the observed drift away from the jury is the product
of a mutual decision. Recent articles have shown that parties on both
sides of a case will seek to avoid an unpredictable verdict. Furthermore, the Coase Theorem states that actors will seek efficiency by cooperating to divide the surplus created by adding value or, as this paper
proposes, eliminating waste. If the only alternative is settlement, then
parties will be induced to settle. However, if there is some value to be
had in bringing a dispute before a third party, then, where ADR is
available, parties will seek it instead of trial. Thus, so long as both sides
perceive that they can get "justice," and if it can be had at a lower cost,
the dispute-resolution process will migrate to the least expensive
alternative.
In short, the variability of jury awards-especially the "outlier"
verdicts at the upper extreme-tends to make the system economically
inefficient, and this inefficiency creates excess profits and costs. Returning to our earlier question, and as an example, one such cost is the
fee of the jury consultant, who is hired in an attempt to reduce the
variance introduced by the jury. The money that a defendant's jury
consultant is paid can be thought of as a slice of the "pure profit pie"
that the plaintiff's lawyer might receive, were the consultants not able
to advise their client to select a jury that minimizes the risk of an outlier
verdict.
V.

THE JURY'S OUT

Of course, despite popular sentiment, there is not universal agreement that very high outlier verdicts or even a "litigation explosion" actually exist to a significant extent. In fact, Professor Arthur Miller,
rests a large part of his argument against the overzealous grant of summary judgment on his perception that there has been no "litigation explosion." He argues that, overall, the number of cases filed is not
growing disproportionately to the population. He also downplays a
perceived rising tide in jury damage awards: "[A] RAND Institute of
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Civil Justice study finding that mean jury verdicts increased in Cook
County and San Francisco . . . found that the median jury verdict
figures, when certain procedural changes in San Francisco were accounted for, actually remained 'strikingly stable' over the twenty-fiveyear period." An increase, however, in the mean-but not the median-most likely reflects an increasing incidence of high-end outlying
verdicts. That is, it is reasonable to conclude that, as the high-end
awards move higher, the variance in awards-and therefore risk-increases, because there is no reason to believe that, over the span of
time studied, the bulk of verdicts became more concentrated around
the median. Even those who might doubt that the empirical evidence
for variance substantiates perceptions of variance adduced by anecdotal evidence do not doubt the reality of the perceptions themselves and
their effect on the vanishing jury trial.
In short, drastic unpredictability inheres in the power of the jury
(above and beyond its basic determination of a verdict on liability-a
process which itself has come under academic scrutiny) to fix damage
awards, as it sees fit, with limited review, and with reversal only in the
most egregious cases, and even then, not often. The jury can be seen as
a sort of "black box" into which various versions of the facts are
dumped and from which an unpredictable answer rolls out. No one
suggests that the award of damages should be taken out of the jury's
province altogether, or that there is a need radically to overhaul theories underlying damage awards. Indeed, scholars have shown that punitive damages are an efficient means to achieve proper deterrence. But
excessive damage awards have an inefficient over-deterrent effect.
More importantly, the simple possibility of excessive damageswhether compensatory or punitive-raises costs for litigants across the
board and affects the dynamics of settlement. This phenomenon was
noted in a recent law review article, in terms of its effect on "repeat
player" defendants: "[F]or insurance companies and other repeat litigants, a major goal (if not the major goal) in pretrial negotiations must
be to avoid those huge verdicts that inflate the mean awards." Economists might deem this whole situation, instead of a "litigation explosion," a "verdict bubble."
Legal economists have advanced numerous theories in an attempt
to arrive at an efficient calculation of damages, concentrating on punitive damages, which, of course, are purely non-economic damages, i.e.,
are not premised upon any loss to the plaintiff reducible to dollars.
One impediment to rationalizing the process is that jurors often en-
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counter difficulty comprehending and implementing a judge's instructions. A recent study has shown that even when presented with a
model (e.g., the Polinsky-Shavell model) for determining punitive damages, jurors will arrive at "incorrect" determinations, i.e., those that are
not efficient. Indeed, other research drawing on psychology has shown
that factors such as so-called "benchmarks," subconsciously set in the
jurors' minds by external sources such as the media, can be just as determinative as the factors that jurors "should" weigh to achieve an efficient outcome. What is most intriguing, and perhaps highly significant,
is that jurors' abilities to weigh properly the factors that determine efficient damages seem to vary directly with demographic variables. The
data suggest that jury awards are not only positively correlated to the
demographic makeup of the jury, but also to other, broader socioeconomic factors, such as the poverty rate in the community from which
the venire is drawn. Factor in group dynamics that actually tend to
increase the variability of jury awards with random, cross-sectional jury
selection, and the conclusion is inevitable that variability, risk, and costs
all must be higher now than in the days of the select jury.
The unpredictability and unreliability of modern jury discretion in
fixing punitive damages has been well-documented, as discussed above.
One would certainly expect the same sort of unpredictability and unreliability to inhere in an average jury's ability to fix compensatory damages, particularly in light of the fact that jurors' accuracy in determining
punitive awards is directly correlated to their socioeconomic and educational background, a factor that would seem to figure equally in a compensatory damage calculation, especially for non-economic damages,
such as pain and suffering. In such cases, juror sympathy or empathy
can be played upon by a skillful plaintiff's attorney like Perlman plays a
fine Stradivarius. We may safely speculate that research would show a
general migration by defendants toward courts whose juries are drawn
from the higher socioeconomic strata. Indeed, removal of cases from
urban state courts to federal courts (with venires drawn from suburban
and rural areas as well as from the urban area) has been noted anecdotally as a favored tactic of the defense, as has avoidance of certain rural
or depressed counties that are "plaintiff-friendly" in terms of high-end
verdicts. In short, the social forces that brought about the demise of
the select jury have injected an element of increased risk (flowing from
unpredictability and variability at the highest end) that, at least in the
perception of some of the users, renders the system inefficient. Obviously, there are potentially as many factors that could account for vari-
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ance in verdicts among juries hearing similar cases as there are factual
differences among cases, and we do not mean to suggest that the composition of the jury is the sole determinant of variance and unpredictability, but it is nonetheless a very important one that must be taken
into account in explaining the lamented disappearance of the jury trial.
To find anecdotal evidence that the verdict bubble is real and is not
a geographically isolated phenomenon, one need go no further than a
major city's classified telephone directory. In one such East Coast directory, one finds advertisements for lawyers who have "won verdicts
and settled cases involving millions of dollars: $3.3 MILLION awarded
for negligent death ... $2.4 MILLION awarded ... $3.35 MILLION
awarded ... $5 MILLION awarded .... " A few pages later is an ad for
a lawyer who claims damage awards won in amounts of $10,250,000,
$4,100,000, $7,390,000, and $12,000,000, and who boasts that "juries just
love him." The perception of huge jury awards as the norm-based
perhaps on a factor as inherently unpredictable as a jury's "love" for a
particularly personable lawyer-is thusly formed.
As the movie Wall Street's fictional tycoon Richard Gekko noted,
"The most valuable commodity I know of is information." This is true
because it is information that drives markets to efficiency, or inefficiency. While Miller notes, correctly, that "jury awards considered excessively high often are reduced by the court or by the parties
themselves by way of settlement, or are reversed altogether on appeal[,]" the damage of unpredictable variance is done as soon as the
verdict is returned. Because these large awards form subliminal
benchmarks for future jurors-and the initial verdict is sure to be the
front page, while its reduction, if it comes, will get one-half column inch
on page twenty-three-the verdict bubble is a self-reinforcing phenomenon. It matters not what the final outcomes of individual cases are
because the mere public perception of rising jury awards adds momentum to the same; this creates a trickle-down effect. If plaintiffs perceive
even the slightest chance of receiving a very large verdict, the power of
numbers and expected returns substantially raises their leverage in demanding a settlement. In this way, the jury's influence today extends
beyond its immediate domain and raises costs for litigants across the
board, above the level that represents efficiency.
VI.

THE VERDICT

Given sufficient information, markets will not tolerate inefficiencies. The modern jury trial entails such an inefficiency. To escape the
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real and perceived costs of the federal jury trial, litigants are flocking to
arbitration and other forms of ADR. The expectation is that, there,
plaintiffs will find faster and less expensive justice and defendants will
be more likely to have their "punishment fit the crime," thereby avoiding the "deep-pocket" phenomenon and optimizing the risk vs. benefit
for both sides.
The inescapable fact is that, unless prohibited from doing so by law
or conduct of their adversaries, disputants will do as they please. This
is not to say that traditional trials will disappear. But there are some
often-overlooked aspects to the decline in tried cases that argue for
again making the courts more attractive to litigants. Most importantly,
as dispute resolution moves out of the courts, society is necessarily deprived of a number of cases that could advance our body of law by
adding new precedents. And, as any lawyer knows, trials as learning
opportunities for junior members of the bar are increasingly rare.
Many "litigators" have garnered most of their experience at depositions
or in mock proceedings, thus diminishing the body of experiential
learning, not to mention "war stories," which themselves play an important educational role.
We have demonstrated that, like any market, the adjudication market is subject to forces beyond the control of any single actor, but the
inputs of every actor undoubtedly influence the market. Accordingly,
those who think the federal courts should retain a significant part of the
adjudication market should seriously consider making those courts
more attractive. This requires the difficult step of questioning whether
the modern jury, as an exercise in pure democracy, is the appropriate
dispute-resolver for all cases, especially complex or otherwise difficult
ones. Commentators have questioned whether, for example, "it [is] fair
to ask a millworker, school custodian, receptionist, plumber, nurse's aid
[sic], housewife, and others possessing no expertise in economics or accounting, to render an accurate verdict based on average variable cost
determinations and tax consequences of inventory accounting?" The
question might just as well have been put as to whether it makes sense
to do so, a question that has been answered no in England and most
other industrialized nations. One answer is to return, at least in complex commercial cases, to a more select jury than the "modern" one.
Although, to be sure, any return to greater selectivity in jury venire
selection according to educational achievement or particular expertise
implicates sensitive social and, perhaps, constitutional questions, it has
been suggested in the literature. If such a course-even given adequate
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safeguards against intentional, invidious discrimination-is too politically unpalatable to be implemented, lesser measures to influence the
sophistication of the venire can surely be undertaken without objection,
e.g., discontinuation of the practice of granting automatic (whether de
jure or de facto) exemptions to classes of individuals such as proprietors of businesses, doctors, and the like. While we have not found any
reported data, we seriously doubt that many executive officers of Fortune 500 companies are empanelled in jury venires, let alone actually
serve as trial jurors.
The bottom line is this: Serious consideration should be given to
offering appropriate alternatives to the current jury selection process in
appropriate cases if the federal courts are to continue to present a viable choice for those shopping for dispute resolution. Otherwise, one
can reasonably expect that the decline in cases reaching trial-in favor
of other forms of dispute resolution-can, on the basis of elemental
market forces, be expected to continue at its present, fairly steady rate
to some irreducible minimum, perhaps consisting mostly of suits involving irrational litigants or those with nothing to lose by "rolling the
dice." The question is whether resistance to jury reform can be overcome by those in the position-and with the determination-to at least
experiment with meaningful change.

